FOCUS on spies, secrets and security, through the eyes of America's most famous intelligence chief, Allen Dulles

THE WORLD OF CLOAK & DANGE



Coinciding curiously with the publication of the Radcliffe Tribunal report, and its reflections on British security, Mr Allen Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence in the United States, has written a major article on 'The Craft of Intelligence.' This important study is appearing in the current issue of "Harper's Magazine," and extracts from it will begin in The Sunday Times next Sunday. Here Henry Brandon, our Washington representative, questions Mr Dulles in an exclusive and revealing interview.

HENRY BRANDON
putting the questions

ALLEN DULLES
giving the answers

BRANDON: How did it happen that you, as a former Director of Central Intelligence, should write a comprehensive article on the craft of intelligence?

DULLES: It was largely because of the weird publicity that has often been given in this country to C.I.A. and our intelligence work. C.I.A. whole series of myths were coming to be quite generally believed. I felt it was high time someone who might be credited with knowing the facts should present a factual account of the intelligence process and its relation to our national security. Of course, this had to be done within the framework of protecting the real secrets of an intelligence organisation.

BRANDON: What really attracted you to the intelligence field?

DULLES: I think it goes way back to when I got out of college in 1914. My class at Princeton was the last of the post-Victorian era in a way—the last class for some years to graduate [illegible] peaceful world. At graduation I ran into a unique character named Sam Higginbottam, who had quite an extraordinary agricultural school in Allahabad. He said: "Well, I'll get you a job on the academic side of this school if you'll come out to India for a year." So I went to India, just as the first world war broke out. Then I kept on and worked my way around the world teaching school. I taught a little in Canton and after that in Peking and then on to Japan and home. I took eighteen months for the trip.

Somewhat from [illegible] somewhat from being brought up here in Washington with my grandfather, John Foster, who was Secretar State under President Harr I grew up with a great int in what's going on in the w and I've kept up my int ever since. But the immed spark was in the first w war. As a diplomat I was doing a kind of intelli work from Switzerland, only on the political side.

Later, as I had known Donovan very well, I w teered to work with him i O.S.S. after Pearl Harbou him I thought the place for me was to go

in 1942. From the intelligence angle it was far easier to get information about what was going on inside Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and occupied France than it is today to get information out of the Soviet Union. There were a lot of people opposed to Hitler, particularly in the occupied areas, and hence a great number of persons who were anxious to give information. So it was a good observation point, Switzerland.

BRANDON : You imply that one of the difficulties of getting intelligence out of Russia is that the opposition there is not what it was in Hitler Germany and occupied Europe.

DULLES : The police system is far more thorough in the Soviet Union and the opposition is not as well organised and trained as it was in Germany. In Russia today there is a very different situation, and while I think there is a good deal of opposition to what I might call the restraints and the restrictions of Communism, there's probably less opposition to Khrushchev as a leader than there was to Hitler or Mussolini.

BRANDON : Did you ever regret going into Intelligence?

DULLES: No. For the United States I was sort of ploughing a new field in Intelligence, and it was interesting to be in on the early days of a new organisation.

BRANDON: Didn't this work circumscribe your personal freedom? Could one not assume that to be head of Intelligence can be a burden?

DULLES: Well, our organisation here in the United States is somewhat different from yours in England. Naturally I never talk about a foreign Intelligence service, particularly the British Intelligence service. But there's a good deal about our service that is public. We are established under a public law. The Director of Central Intelligence in the United States is confirmed by the Senate and so is the Deputy Director. A great deal of what he does is within the public domain. He is chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, which corresponds to a similar organisation you have that's headed by a high Foreign Office man. So all of that work in a sense is as much in the public domain as the public side of Foreign Office work. I am referring to the estimative side—the preparing of the Intelligence position papers for the Executive branch of our Government. That's all a part of the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. So he is a split personality. He has his public [illegible] that is related to secret Intelligence, what is generally known as espionage.

BRANDON : Did it restrict you in your travels?

DULLES : Well, I couldn't go to the Soviet Union. At least I never tried. And I didn't go behind the Iron Curtain. But I travelled quite freely otherwise. In 1956 I took a trip around the world and visited scores of countries.

BRANDON : Would you want to visit the Soviet Union now?

DULLES : If they gave me a visa certainly I would feel it safe to go. But I don't think I would go now because a lot of people would say : " This fellow knows too much and he ought not to be over there, he ought not to expose the knowledge he has to a possible accident." I don't think there'd be any accident, but people might think there could be one.

BRANDON: Has an attempt ever been made on your life?

DULLES: No. Nobody has ever shot at me as far as I know. I was careful when I was in Switzerland. I never crossed the enemy frontier and did not go really right up to the frontier. I wouldn't just go and look over the frontier because, you remember, there was an accident in Holland one time affecting some of your people.

BRANDON: Looking back, what do you consider your greatest successes?

DULLES: Probably the greatest success in the war days was related to the surrender in North Italy. That's a long story. But I did establish a contact with the German command in Northern Italy, on their initiative, of course. And thanks to the complete co-operation of Field Marshal Alexander, for whom I have the highest respect and regard, it became possible to pull off an early surrender in North Italy on May 2, 1945, or about a week before the surrender in the North. That, I think, had real importance because there was a race to see who was going to be first in Trieste and in Northern Italy, the Communists or the West. The war was over militarily but the question was where the meeting-point of the armies would be in Italy. In the North, you see, in Germany, the zones were established, but they weren't established in Italy; and if Tito with Soviet forces right behind him had moved into the North Italian plain, joined up with those Italian partisans who were Communists—and they were very strong—you might have had a very different situation there.

You may recall th did everything he cou to block the Italian s In fact, the first real message sent by S Roosevelt was on th business, sent a few da Roosevelt died. It an President tremendou accused the United S bad faith, of trying to a secret agreement wit that we were negotiati the Nazis to open Western front to us build up the Easter against the Russians.

BRANDON : And recent history?

DULLES : There accomplishments one talk about. Of what public domain, I wou probably the most i was the success in and causing to be publ famous speech of Kh —the speech he made uncovering Stalin's cr has never been publish Soviet Union. We we get the text of it and Department then publi full text. How it was —that is still classifie



The Cuba withdrawal of Soviet bombers [illegible] on their way back to Russia.

you would have mentioned the U-2 plane as one of your great-est recent successes.

DULLES: I would say that the U-2 was the most valuable new collector of intelligence with which I had anything to do.

BRANDON: In terms of American national interest, wasn't this a greater feat than collecting the Stalin speech?

DULLES: It was more important from the point of view of our military preparedness programme and probably more valuable from the point of view of American security. Publication of the Khrushchev speech threw confusion into the ranks of the Communist parties, and therefore had more direct repercussions, I think, on the Soviet Union. As an instrument of collecting intelligence, I would certainly put the U-2 as the most important accomplishment during the period I was director.

BRANDON: There are so many new collectors of intelligence, as you call them. Has this deeply affected the whole business of intelligence?

DULLES: As I point out in my article, during the last decade or more, scientific methods of collecting intelligence have made great strides. Here Winston Churchill pioneered in the dark days of September, 1940. Then, in the Battle of Britain, radar may well have been a determining factor; radar plus the valour of your airmen, of course. But particularly during the last ten years the whole scientific and technological side of the collection of intelligence has been greatly developed — all the techniques for detecting nuclear explosions, for monitoring missile firings and space shots, and there are other fields which are still highly classified. So that you now have technological instruments and collectors of intelligence competing in a sense with the human. But one finds that these technological, scientific weapons require the highest human skills to operate them, so that you never are going to be able to handle intelligence with machines alone.

BRANDON: Would you say that secrecy, which the Russians consider such a great asset to their national security, is now much less of an advantage with all these new scientific devices?

DULLES: It's still an advantage to them, because with all our techniques there's still a good deal that's very hard to penetrate. They have the advantage over us that they don't publish very much that's of value. We publish a vast amount of tremendous value to them.

BRANDON: Can in fact these scientific inventions

DULLES: Well, you have always a battle. There's the battle between the attempt of a particular country like the Soviet Union to keep things secret and the various means one has, technical and others, of penetrating that secrecy. As they bring up more obstacles you try to bring up more sophisticated devices. It's a continuing contest.

BRANDON: In this world of enormous weapons, secrets that used to be so important for intelligence twenty years ago, battle plans and battle positions, seem to me to be losing in importance.

DULLES: That's true. We like to know how many divisions the Soviets have, but that, to my mind, has a second-rate importance to their missile strength.

BRANDON: What do you think is the central interest for Intelligence in the future?

DULLES: There is always great interest in knowing what their basic policy is. One speculates on why they put missiles into Cuba. What were they trying to get at? What is going to be the relationship between Communist China and Russia? Those political factors are of tremendous importance, if you can get at their real purposes; and, at times, I think one can. Then, of course, in the field of military hardware the areas of greatest importance are their nuclear developments, missile developments, and the marriage of the two.

BRANDON: You mention in your article the case of the decision of pushing forward to the Yalu River*; it seemed that your estimates indicated that it was a fairly good risk doing it. But I remember that the political offices in the State Department, the Soviet experts, advised against it. How are the political Intelligence estimates meshed up with the estimates of the political experts who base their judgment clearly on either experience or instinct?

DULLES: I was not in Government at the time of the Yalu and therefore I was later looking at the estimate as an outsider. I came to Washington immediately after the Yalu business — supposedly for six weeks. I stayed on for eleven years. All I meant to say there was that the Intelligence estimate was inconclusive, did not clearly say

* In the autumn of 1950, the U.S. Government faced the difficult decision of whether to give orders to General MacArthur to push forward to the Yalu River and thereby aim at reuniting Korea. A great controversy then ensued inside the U.S. Government whether this would lead to Chinese Communist intervention or not. General MacArthur was later dismissed by President [illegible] because he did not agree with the American policy of limiting the war in Korea.

favoured Chinese Communist intervention in force. It did [illegible] but thought it was [illegible]

You ask how the political side is meshed into the estimate. Well, on the United States Intelligence Board, which approves the estimate, the senior Intelligence officer of the Department of State is a member of that board and brings to it, particularly on a matter of an international political character, the views and judgment of the State Department just as the G-2 and Air and Naval Intelligence would bring their views. It is then up to the Director of Central Intelligence to finalise the estimate. But if there is any disagreement from that estimate any dissenting member of the Board can make a dissent. This is included, in the words that the dissenter chooses. So State Department views would be very clearly represented in any estimate.

BRANDON: And that report then goes to the President?

DULLES: To the President and to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, and any others down the line on a need-to-know basis.

BRANDON: Security is always a complicated problem where great secrecy is required. Under your direction the C.I.A. appears to have had little serious trouble in this area.

DULLES: You mean, I suppose, that C.I.A. over the last decade or more has had no publicity indicating serious spy troubles in its ranks. I don't believe in boasting. In fact I am superstitious about it. When I was in the C.I.A. we did try to install the best security arrangements we could devise. However, like you, we are vulnerable despite every precaution, and must be on our guard. In our free societies we cannot install the totalitarian procedures which might add to our physical security but would destroy our free way of life. Hence accidents are likely to occur in the security field.

BRANDON: About a year ago this problem, as it affected the British Government, was dealt with in the Radcliffe Report. Would you comment on that report?

DULLES: I found it extremely enlightening. I was particularly interested in the report's emphasis on the fact that one was trying to protect too much and relying too heavily on overclassification of papers to compensate for a lack of basic security in handling them. Then, too, I read with great interest the report's history of your D Notice procedure. This is something [illegible] but seems to me to have considerable merit.